

NOMINATION OF PAUL H. NITZE

HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF PAUL H. NITZE, OF MARYLAND, TO BE
AMBASSADOR WHILE SERVING AS HEAD OF THE U.S.
DELEGATION TO THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR
FORCES NEGOTIATIONS

MARCH 24, 1982

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(III)

NOMINATION OF PAUL H. NITZE

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1982

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:25 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Mathias, and Pell.

Senator MATHIAS [presiding]. The committee will come to order.

We are meeting this afternoon to receive testimony from Paul H. Nitze on his nomination to the position of head of the U.S. Delegation to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations to be held in Geneva, with the rank of Ambassador.

It is a very personal pleasure for the Chair to welcome Ambassador Nitze to this session. He is no stranger to this room or to this committee or to the Senate. I am very proud of the fact that he is a resident of the State of Maryland.

We could say a great deal about his qualifications for the job on which he has already entered, but his experience in government has been extraordinary. He has served as Secretary of the Navy and as Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was one of the negotiators of SALT I. He has already distinguished himself in the negotiations in Geneva.

I think perhaps the way to sum it all up is to say that he is a patriot, and we are happy to welcome him here today.

Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We just heard from Mr. Nitze in closed session. It is clear to us all that the President has in Mr. Nitze a skilled and diligent negotiator, fully capable of reaching a solid agreement in good time, and I trust he has the will and the desire to do so. It is necessary to give him every chance to succeed.

In this regard, the administration got off to a pretty slow start with the intermediate range nuclear force negotiations, since it took a year for them to begin negotiations. Of course, that is a better record than we have seen in the case of START [strategic arms reduction talks], which still remain unscheduled. Other arms control initiatives remain apparently moribund.

There is strong bipartisan support for success in the INF talks. I was very pleased when the President announced his INF initiative last year. Success will require the President's continued commitment and pressure upon the bureaucracy, and in the end both sides will have to compromise if we are to have any kind of strong, verifiable agreement.

In this regard, Democrats and Republicans alike have been supportive of every indication of administration commitment to arms control.

The only regret is there have not been too many such indications. I, for one, hoped this administration would build upon the achievements of prior administrations, Democratic and Republican. I still have hopes, because I think there is little time left for dalliance.

We must move arms control to the forefront. If the administration does not soon demonstrate that it is really honest and meaningful in its arms control endeavors, it will have to deal with an angry and restive Congress and public. People will be in the streets in America, just as they have been in Europe.

I wish you luck and I hope you will move ahead. We wish you encouragement in every way, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Nitze, do you have a statement for the committee?

[Ambassador Nitze's biographical sketch follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PAUL HENRY NITZE

Present Position: Head of the United States Delegation to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Negotiations.

Office Address: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.

Born: January 26, 1907, Amherst, Massachusetts.

Legal Residence: Bel Alton, Maryland.

Marital Status: Married.

Family: Wife: former Phyllis Pratt; Children: Heidi, Peter, William, Phyllis.

Home Address: 3120 Woodley Road, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008.

Education: A.B. (cum laude) 1928, Harvard University.

Language Ability: German and French (both—good, self-appraisal).

Experience: Non-Government—1929-38 and 1939-40, Vice President, Dillon, Read and Company, New York, New York; 1938-39, President, P. H. Nitze and Company, New York, New York; 1953-61, President, Foreign Service Educational Foundation, Washington, D.C.; 1974-81 Self-employed Consultant, Washington, D.C.

Government—1941-42, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C.; 1942-43, Chief of Bureau, Board of Economic Warfare; 1943-44, Director of Bureau, Foreign Economic Administration; 1944-46, Vice Chairman, United States Strategic Bombing Survey; 1946-53, Director of Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; 1961-63, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; 1963-67, Secretary of the Navy; 1967-69, Deputy Secretary of Defense; 1969-74, Member of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; 1981 to present, Head of the United States Delegation to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Awards: Medal for Merit, 1946; Medal for Distinguished Public Service, Department of Defense, 1973 and 1977.

Publications: Author: U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-55; Numerous articles.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL H. NITZE, OF MARYLAND, NOMINATED TO BE HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES NEGOTIATIONS, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Ambassador NITZE. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to appear before the committee today to discuss with you my nomination by the President to serve as the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the personal rank of Ambassador. I have already for some months been acting in the position for which I have been nominated.

It had been agreed that the negotiations should begin on November 30, 1981. The time required to complete the executive branch clearance procedures precluded the submission of my nomination in time for hearings before your committee prior to that date. An interim appointment was therefore necessary.

In his address on November 18, 1981, President Reagan announced specific proposals for the then forthcoming INF negotiations in Geneva. The President noted his desire to preserve the peace in Europe and he also highlighted the principal problem facing Western Europe at this time—the growing threat to the region “posed by the continuing deployment of certain Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles.”

Such missiles include the mobile and transportable SS-20 missile system, which is equipped with three accurate multiple and independently targetable reentry vehicles capable of striking targets throughout Western Europe even from locations well beyond the Ural Mountains—as well as the older SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems.

In order to arrest the growing imbalance in Europe, the NATO allies agreed in 1979 to adopt a two-track program of new missile deployments to serve as a counter and therefore a deterrent to this threat and simultaneous arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit the deployment of such intermediate range nuclear weapons on both sides. As part of the President's November 18 speech, he outlined the arms control proposal that the United States, in close consultation with its NATO allies, had formulated for presentation to the Soviets when the INF negotiations began.

This proposal, which we formally presented to the Soviets in Geneva in December and tabled as a draft treaty in February, provides in its basic provisions that the United States will cancel its planned deployment of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems.

In formulating our initial INF proposal, we needed to decide whether it would deal solely with missiles or with aircraft as well. Our aircraft are almost entirely dual capable. In fact, their primary mission is nonnuclear. We chose to focus on missiles because their destructive power and range, combined with their short flight time and high probability of penetration, made them highly destabilizing and thus the most immediate threat to peace in Europe and to peace in the world.

In registering their endorsement of the proposal to reduce the level of such missiles to zero on both sides, the NATO foreign ministers stated that this offer was “straightforward and equitable and would eliminate the systems of greatest concern to both sides.”

In order to preserve the peace in Europe and sustain the freedom and independence there that have existed since World War II, it was imperative that a substantive plan be developed for handling the growing challenge to the region and the alliance system. One essential precondition to the success of such a plan is the seriousness and wisdom with which the United States approaches the task.

We cannot set a firm deadline at this time for the completion of an agreement, as we might then become hostage to accepting a less than equitable treaty, which would not serve the long-term interests of peace and security. There are many complex issues still to be resolved, but

we are moving ahead in a vigorous and orderly manner in the conduct of these negotiations.

As the talks proceed, we will continue to coordinate closely with our allies, who have provided valuable contributions to these negotiations. I also look forward to communicating with the Congress to keep you abreast of significant developments and to seek your views on the direction we should be taking.

In my initial discussions with Ambassador Kvitsinskiy, the head of the Soviet delegation, I proposed that he and I and our two delegations maintain the confidentiality of the exchanges between us. Only thus can serious negotiations be brought to a successful conclusion. I made it clear that I expected fully to brief the NATO governments and the Congress of the United States and was confident that they also would wish to preserve the seriousness of our talks.

I, therefore, much appreciate having had the opportunity to brief your committee earlier this afternoon in executive session on the details of our negotiating exchanges.

Mr. Chairman, I would now be happy to answer questions regarding the main thrust of the INF negotiations and provide any information which would be helpful to the committee in considering my nomination.

Thank you.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Nitze.

One of the goals of our efforts to improve our relationship with the Soviet Union over the years has been sometimes called confidence building, an effort to establish some degree of trust in each other's intentions and in each other's motivations. Confidence tends to be shattered by an event such as Afghanistan. But we still have to continue to do business on urgent matters, such as the matters upon which you are engaged, the theater nuclear forces.

What is your opinion as to whether the Soviet Union is approaching this negotiation seriously, whether it is approaching it with a real desire to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement?

Ambassador NITZE. It is my opinion that they are approaching these negotiations seriously. The question at issue, as to whether they really wish to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement, depends in large measure as to what they consider should be acceptable to us.

I believe they think what should be acceptable to us differs quite a lot from what I think should be acceptable to us. Now, they would like to see an agreement which I believe to be one-sided in their favor, and they believe that that should be acceptable to us. But I do not think it should be.

Senator MATHIAS. But you have no question about the serious nature of their approach to these negotiations?

Ambassador NITZE. None at all. They are extremely serious and extremely businesslike in their negotiations. I think the negotiations so far to date have been extremely constructive.

We have had an opportunity to lay forth before the Soviet delegation the underlying reasons for the President's proposal, and we have had a chance to lay out before them a draft treaty fully spelled out in all its provisions, and to go through an article-by-article analysis of the reasons for each one of its provisions.

They have had an opportunity to spell out in greater detail than was contained in Mr. Brezhnev's initial speeches in Bonn before our negotiations began the proposals that they had in mind. We discussed, I think, all of the major issues, which are many, between us, and these have been extremely serious discussions.

I am certain that we now better understand not only their position, but also ours, as a result of the full and serious debate that is taking place between us. They have also said that these exchanges between us have helped their side understand the issues better.

Now, that is not to say that we have yet gotten to a point where one could say that both sides see the issues in quite the same way. Big differences still remain between the two sides.

Senator MATHIAS. In your statement you say that in order to arrest the growing imbalance in Europe the NATO allies agreed in 1979 to adopt a two-track program of new missile deployments to serve as a counter and, therefore, a deterrent to this threat, and simultaneous arms control negotiations.

It was not only an allied agreement, but the initiative for that two-track system in large measure came from Europe, did it not?

Ambassador NITZE. My recollection is that the agreement for a two-track decision was worked out with the full agreement both of the Europeans involved in the conference and the Americans there.

Senator MATHIAS. And your negotiations are predicated on both rails of that track; are they not?

Ambassador NITZE. They are, indeed.

Senator MATHIAS. What in your judgment would be the effect if we did not lay the second rail? In other words, President Reagan has now laid the first rail by sending you to Geneva. If the second rail does not come about, can this be a monorail operation or would that affect your ability to negotiate?

Ambassador NITZE. I think it would seriously affect our ability to negotiate if the deployment rail were to be abandoned without success in the negotiations. Clearly, if there were success in the negotiations, then that would presume a change in the deployment rail.

Under the President's proposal, we would not deploy the Pershing II's and we would not deploy the GLCM's if the Soviet Union were to accept the President's proposal. But for us to abandon the deployment of the Pershing II's and the GLCM's without having some success in limiting the threat which caused the decision to deploy them would in fact undermine our entire effort. We think it would make it impossible.

Senator MATHIAS. Do you not think a monorail will run?

Ambassador NITZE. No.

Senator MATHIAS. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. I was just trying to think, monorail and dual rail—what about a third rail, to give it some force? [Laughter.]

Senator MATHIAS. The third rail is usually charged.

Senator PELL. Yes. Perhaps that is what is needed here. [Laughter.]

We know that the goal of the Reagan administration is to reduce the intermediate nuclear missiles to zero. Do you expect that such an agreement would also cover conventionally armed weapons? Are you free to say in this public hearing?

Ambassador NITZE. The subject matter of our negotiations was agreed by both sides to involve nuclear weapons. Now, the problem of whether or not one can reliably control and limit nuclear weapons without simultaneously limiting very similar conventional weapons is a question that we have to go into later in the negotiations.

The President's proposal calls for the prohibition of these ground-launched cruise missiles and the Pershing II ballistic missiles on our side. And it calls for not only the elimination of the launchers for those weapons, but for the elimination of all missiles and all production and all testing of such missiles, whether they be conventionally armed or nuclear armed. Anything that is a Pershing II is banned. You cannot produce it, you cannot test it.

Now, with respect to future missiles, the President's proposal calls for banning nuclear missiles of comparable range. Whether in an individual instance it would also be necessary to ban conventional weapons depends upon the type of conventional weapon you are talking about.

Senator PELL. But theoretically we could develop a Pershing III with conventional warheads and that would not be covered by such an agreement.

Ambassador NITZE. It depends on how close it is to the Pershing II and it depends how the individual provisions are worked out in detail.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Are you involved in consultations with any of our NATO allies on the developments in INF? If so, can you tell us in public session in what way they would participate?

Ambassador NITZE. We work with our allies in NATO in two different ways. With respect to the reporting on the negotiations, I and Ambassador Glitman, my deputy, go to the NATO Council from time to time—we were there last Wednesday—and report in detail on the negotiations and on everything that has taken place during the negotiations.

But then there is another group called the Special Consultative Group, which is composed of representatives of all of the interested NATO nations, which works on the policy considerations which led to our initial instructions, which might lead to any change in our instructions. So there are two different forums involved.

Senator PELL. I have two more general questions. But I would like to ask first: Obviously, the administration does not like the idea of the freeze concept that many of us on the Hill have supported, and I am one. But what other kind of approach do you think the administration can take to give to the American people real evidence that the administration is truly serious about arms control? I do not think that message has gotten through to the American public yet or to the Congress.

Ambassador NITZE. I think, in the field of INF missiles, these intermediate range nuclear forces, the President's proposal of November 18 was thoroughly thought through and does have merit. It has the support of the majority of people in Europe, certainly all the governments in Europe, and I think it received the support of the people here in the United States.

Now, my hope would be that the executive branch will develop a position with respect to START, in other words the strategic missiles and planes, which will be comparably well thought through and as

solid and as sound as the INF position, and that the President will make such a position public in due time and that the situation will develop so that it will be appropriate for SALT-START negotiations to begin.

Senator PELL. I think many Americans share that hope. A year is a pretty long time to still be planning. We hope this transpires.

Finally, Mr. Ambassador, if you could look ahead in your crystal ball for 25 years down the road or for a period of time down the road, and if we have not destroyed ourselves with a nuclear holocaust, what kind of nuclear weapons world do you see? Do you see the genie back in the bottle, with each side having maybe 100 weapons or no weapons?

What do you think the long-term objective is here, long after you and I are gone?

Ambassador NITZE. I would be surprised if the objective would be as low a figure as you suggested. We went through that in the early days of thought on arms control. The initial thought, of course, was to have none, to control the whole nuclear process, the raw material, the nuclear plants and everything.

Senator PELL. The Baruch plan was we were going to turn it over to the U.N.

Ambassador NITZE. Exactly. That was the original thought, so that nuclear material would not be in the hands of any nation. It would all be controlled by an international organization. That was the original hope.

Thereafter we had hoped we could get to what was called total and complete nuclear disarmament. But then that turned out to be not feasible and really not realistic. I think then most of those who were thinking about the matter came to the conclusion that it was desirable to have some number of weapons, adequate to protect against the possibility of a madman getting access to nuclear weapons, and that a situation where there was not any appreciable number of weapons in the hands of the great powers would be very dangerous and unstable.

You know, you could imagine the great powers, having gone down, say, to 100 weapons and then somebody coming up with 200 and threatening dire things. So I think there is some lower figure below which it is unsound to go. But I think there is enormous room for great reductions, with an increase in the security of both the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Senator PELL. But there must be, in your mind and in the mind of your Soviet opposite number, some number. You two men have thought about this so much and for so long. There must be some long-term objective for what you see. It would probably be a rather similar objective, I would imagine.

Can you outline that a little bit more? Would it be about the same number as now? Would you say you do not think we could achieve total and complete nuclear disarmament ever?

Ambassador NITZE. I do not believe so. I do not see how it could be done with any great security. I think you would leave yourself open to very great instability. It is too easy for people to make nuclear weapons. I do not think you can put that genie completely back into the bottle. I wish one could, but I do not think one can.

Well, you asked me for my opinion and my opinion is that the most stabilizing thing would be to have weapons, as far as ICBM's are concerned, which were very small, which could not be MIRVed. I would say if one had weapons none of which had a throw-weight of greater than 100 kilograms—you cannot MIRV such a weapon—then I would think that a substantial number of such weapons both on the Soviet side and on the U.S. side would be stable and reliable and would not be vulnerable to being upset by a small number of weapons in the hands of some lunatic.

Senator PELL. Finally, do you think that would be the same thought in the mind of your Soviet counterpart, or have you ever discussed this with him?

Ambassador NITZE. Oh, I have discussed it. I think some of them would agree with me that that is the direction in which we ought to go. But they themselves say there are others on the Soviet side who do not look at it that way, who would think that greater security for the U.S.S.R. can be gained by overwhelmingly predominant forces.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Ambassador Nitze, we very much appreciated the earlier opportunity we had to talk with you in closed session. It was an extremely enlightening and helpful session.

This open session now is on your confirmation. In fact, it is the only one in my history in the Senate—and I have been here for 15 years—that has been held 6 months after the nominee has been working. But I think it is great testimony of the fact that we have total confidence in you.

In a sense, this is not a review of your qualifications for the job, for which we feel you are eminently qualified. Indeed, we are grateful to you for accepting this responsibility and performing as you have. But it is a fine opportunity for us to review in open session so many of the issues that involve arms control.

I would like first to ask your judgment on a startling statement that was made by Mr. T. K. Jones, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, which received wide publicity and has been widely discussed. He said in a Los Angeles Times interview that America could fully recover from an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union in 2 to 4 years, provided we had a Soviet-style civil defense.

According to Mr. Jones: "Everyone is going to make it if only there are enough shovels to go around." In other words, put 2 feet of dirt over us after we dig a hole and just climb in and stay there for what, 6 months or 3 months or however long it would take. He just does not say.

A subcommittee of this committee invited and requested Mr. Jones to testify. He was to be here last Tuesday, that is a week ago Tuesday, and on Friday night he canceled and did not appear. I have subsequently talked to him and he has agreed to appear before the committee.

After his refusal or unwillingness to appear and the cancellation, I sent telegrams to a number of former officials of the Defense Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, many, perhaps

all of whom, you know, for their opinions. I would like to read just a few and ask you for your judgment on them.

This is one of the most profound questions put to the country. Arms control and nuclear war is a phenomenon that is sweeping the country now. As we well know, town hall meetings have been held in New England, and I participated last Sunday in the largest meeting that I have ever attended on the North Shore of Chicago. It was jam-packed. We were talking on the subject of one thing, nuclear war.

Mr. Jones did appear at that meeting, so I had a chance to discuss all of these cables with him.

Harold Brown gave this statement:

All-out civil defense could save some lives, even in an all-out nuclear war. But the United States and the Soviet Union would not survive an all-out strategic war as viable societies at any level of civil defense that has been contemplated for the United States, nor at any level that the Soviet Union has put into place.

Gerard Smith is a former ACDA head and chief SALT negotiator. His telegram back to me was the shortest: "Bunkum." That is all he said.

Tom Watson, former Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and Chairman of the ACDA Advisory Committee on Arms Control of the President, said:

Re your telegram, a suggestion that there would be a high survival rate and quick recovery after a major United States-Soviet nuclear exchange is utter nonsense. Those who suggest this unrealistic result of nuclear war add to the present peril and to misunderstanding of the devastating results of the use of nuclear weapons. They are either misinformed or lack common sense or both.

That is signed "Thomas J. Watson, Jr."

General Seignious, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said:

If Mr. Jones said the statement quoted in your telegram, I consider it an outrageous transgression of logic and fact, one apparently intended to influence unknowing citizens. Shovels provide little protection against disease, fire, radiation, thrust-blast and starvation. The back to the caveman idea is hardly good defense policy.

Paul Warnke, former Director of ACDA and chief SALT negotiator, said:

I read the reported remarks of Mr. T. K. Jones with disbelief and dismay. It is either a sick joke or an irresponsible effort to downplay the horror of nuclear war. His civil defense proposals would help solve only one problem, that of body disposal.

Secretary McNamara said:

You have asked me whether the U.S. could recover from an all-out nuclear attack in two to four years if we had a Soviet-style civil defense. Such an attack could involve a strike by as many as 6,000 or 7,000 warheads with an explosive yield of perhaps 10,000 megatons. I know of no form of civil defense which would permit the nation to "recover" from such an attack.

General Jones and others have all sent cables in a similar vein.

As one of the truly great nuclear experts in the world today, what is your own feeling about survivability?

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would yield before the Ambassador responds to your question?

The CHAIRMAN. Surely.

Senator HELMS. When you spoke to Mr. Jones, did he acknowledge that the quote attributed to him was correct?

The CHAIRMAN. He said that he has had trouble with the press, but at no time did he say that he was inaccurately quoted.

Senator HELMS. Did you ask him?

The CHAIRMAN. At no time did he say that he was. I read these to him and he just said he has trouble with the press. Well, we all have trouble with the press, but the question is, did he say that. And if he is willing to go before a town hall meeting in Winnetka, Ill., and talk about nuclear war, why not come before the Senate of the United States?

I made it eminently clear to him that we expect him to come and explain his position. I asked him this question and he did not respond to it. But my concern was, were you talking as an individual or were you talking for the administration? Because you cannot give just personal opinions and hold a position as powerful and as influential as his is in the Department of Defense without having an inference that he is speaking on behalf of the administration.

I have not talked with anyone in the administration who takes that position. We would gain an undue degree of security if we felt we could survive, and part of our problem is to have the world comprehend and understand the magnitude of what we are building up and have built up. That is the necessity of rational arms control, not unilateral disarmament by any means. But it has to be mutual, verifiable and on both sides.

Your judgment on this would be very much appreciated. Mr. Jones will appear before the committee on March 31.

Ambassador NITZE. I rather share Senator Helms' question as to whether Mr. Jones actually said what he is purported to have said or if he gave any indication that he really meant that. But he is coming before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he has had since January to deny it and there has been no public denial that I know of.

Ambassador NITZE. Well, with respect to the quotations that you gave, I would agree with the quotation you read of Mr. McNamara.

Let me make two points on the other side of this. I was present, indeed conducted, the investigation of the effects of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I was in charge of the investigation of the effects of the nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

One of the things that struck us in that investigation was the high effectiveness of the very crude civil defense measures which they had taken. That attack was without warning, so that it was just by chance that some people were in the very crude shelters that they had. Those who were in the shelters directly under the nuclear blast did in fact survive because there had been 8 feet of dirt over them.

It is true that a few feet of dirt will give you enormous protection from radiation, and it is also true that shelters can give you very great protection from blast. It would seem to me to be important for the United States to recognize that there are things that can be done through civil defense which will mitigate the effects of a nuclear war if that disaster were ever to occur.

But to say that you can recover in 2 to 4 years I think would be impossible. That is what McNamara said and that is why I agree with him.

I want to repeat that one should not take this as an opportunity to denigrate the potential effectiveness of civil defense, particularly from the standpoint of reinforcing the deterrence and credibility of our posture. I know that these are unpopular things to say, but I think they are true, and you asked me.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the articles I recently read was an article by Jonathan Schell in the New Yorker magazine. If it is half true, it is a rather frightening thing. The problem, of course, is what happens if one of these buttons that exists, one in Washington, one in Moscow, is pushed. What happens? Where do you stop the thing?

That is why I emphasize the utter importance of your task and your duties and your job and your responsibility. We must really devote ourselves to this and move forward just as rapidly as we can in this area, though it has to be on a mutually verifiable basis and not a unilateral basis.

Ambassador NITZE. Mr. Chairman, having supervised the investigations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I think it was as a result of that experience that I have devoted the best part of my life since that time to doing what I can to contribute to doing something about this. That is why I would suggest that the important thing to do is to try to the best of one's ability to keep the facts in mind and to put calipers on them, and to avoid those things that are an overstatement in either direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I have a few more questions. But Senator Helms, I would be happy to yield to you at this point.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have a couple of questions. I do not know T. K. Jones all that well, but I cannot imagine anyone saying "everyone is going to make it." Good Lord, if we unload missiles full of jellybeans at each other not everyone is going to make it, you know.

So I, too, would be very interested in Mr. Jones' testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, if he has a shovel. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. Even with jellybeans, a shovel will not make too much difference. Well, I do not want to play games with that.

Mr. Ambassador, the thing that troubles me about this dialog is that it is so one-sided, it seems to me, in terms of the administration appropriately responding to it. On a scale of 1 to 10, what chance do you think there is that the Soviet Union ever will consent to verification in any arms control or arms reduction treaty? I prefer the latter by far.

Ambassador NITZE. Mr. Senator, I believe that depends upon what you mean by verification. Certainly they have agreed to verification in past treaties. And I believe also that it is true that they want to be sure that they can verify treaties. So the problem comes down really not with respect to verification, but as to measures in addition to national technical means.

Their position is that one should rely upon what are called national technical means. Our position is, in addition to national technical means, particularly with systems that are smaller than the SS-18's, 19's and 17's, such as the INF missiles which are transportable and mobile, that one will probably need measures in addition to national

technical means in order to have high confidence in the verifiability of the limitations agreed upon.

I think it is too early in our negotiations to go into all of the details with the Russians on that at this time. It is much better, first of all, to have an approximate understanding of the obligations of both sides under the agreement, if both sides can agree, and at that time to go into it in far greater detail than we have been able to do as yet.

Senator HELMS. I am not sure that I understood what you said in response. Are you satisfied with verification as it now stands?

Ambassador NITZE. Not wholly. But I am not wholly dissatisfied with it, either. We have done a lot of work on verification.

Senator HELMS. There are people in the Pentagon who have told me that there has been a substantial amount of cheating by the Soviet Union. Are they incorrect?

Ambassador NITZE. That is a complicated question, Senator. One has to be clear as to what one means, which obligations is one talking about. In SALT I the agreements were misdescribed by some of the witnesses in favor of them.

Senator HELMS. What did you say?

Ambassador NITZE. The agreements were misdescribed by some of the witnesses in favor of them and they rather suggested that the Soviet Union had subscribed to obligations which are not clearly defined in the agreements.

Now, on the other hand, if you take the actual obligations clearly defined in the agreements, there it is a different question as to whether they have cheated on that. On some of them I think they probably have cheated, but it is not clearcut.

Senator HELMS. Are you saying, then, what many others have said, that SALT I as drafted was defective in terms of definition?

Ambassador NITZE. I am saying that.

Senator HELMS. At a very minimum, on any treaty that would be proposed in this Senate, would you say that the craftsmanship and the draftsmanship would both have to be superior to SALT I?

Ambassador NITZE. I think that is correct. But I would not want to hold out the hope that you could have it absolutely foolproof. There will continue to be problems.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.

Ambassador Nitze, from your statement it is perfectly obvious that a very wide gap exists between the United States and the Soviet Union opening positions in these talks. Do you have any basis for any optimism at all that progress is being achieved or will be achieved in these talks?

Ambassador NITZE. I find it very difficult to have firm views as to what is going to happen in the future. But I am optimistic.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your degree of confidence, consulting frequently with our allies as you do, that they will stand firm behind the December 1979 NATO decision to go forward with the planned deployments unless the talks succeed?

Ambassador NITZE. I have the feeling that the public support for the U.S. INF position is greater now than it was 3 or 4 months ago. I do not believe that there has been an erosion in public support since the President's speech. There could be an erosion of support and

the support is not fully solid everywhere. But I think the governments are wholly behind this position, and insofar as public opinion stays with them they will stay with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, public opinion, you said, is behind the President's talk, which is a zero-based option. But specifically the question is, Will the NATO allies, will those governments, if the talks do not succeed, go forward with the 1979 December decision for modernization?

Ambassador NITZE. I think they will, but I cannot guarantee it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Your present feeling is that they would, though?

Ambassador NITZE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Some observers believe that little or no movement is likely until the Soviets come to accept the fact that NATO's unity on this score cannot be shaken. I am of that opinion. I think they may be waiting to see, hoping that they may fall apart on this issue.

Do you share this view? If so, when do you think the Soviets will come around?

Ambassador NITZE. I do not wholly share the view. I believe the Soviets see the work progressing on the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missiles, and not only on the testing and development of the weapons themselves, but on the base facilities for their deployment in Europe.

I think they would prefer to see an agreement reached earlier rather than later. But I agree with you that the pressure on them to get to an agreement should increase over time as we get closer to the actual operational date and as it becomes more and more evident that our NATO allies propose to go forward with the deployment, in spite of the public opinion problems that some of them have.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senate were to pass the proposed joint resolution calling for a freeze on all nuclear weapons deployments, what would be the effect on our negotiating position in Geneva?

Ambassador NITZE. I think it would be destroyed. I see no reason for the Soviet Union to negotiate for a zero end result on missiles of this class if we are frozen at zero and they are frozen at a very substantial number, which is the current situation.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting that I attended in Winnetka, Ill., an area that you know well, had as its subject nuclear war. But it was quite obvious that the underlying thread and commonality of a lot of people there was that they were for the freeze.

I did indicate that this committee will be holding hearings on that resolution and on other resolutions that have been introduced, including one that I put in last week, and one that Chairman Zablocki has put into the House which is a comparable resolution, calling for an immediate beginning to the START talks and so forth.

I was quite interested by another column that appeared in the Los Angeles Times. Let me say that I am not a cosponsor of the freeze resolution, though I think it has 100 members in the House and 20 Members in the Senate on it now.

But I was rather interested in James Kilpatrick's column in the Los Angeles Times, the syndicated columnist. He is a respected conservative columnist and he said this:

John Stuart Mill once had an especially unkind thing to say about conservatives. "It is the law of their existence," he sniffed, "that makes them the stupidist party." Unless words have lost their meaning, the Kennedy-Hatfield liberals are proposing exactly what Reagan's START proposed in November.

That is, START being the strategic arms reduction talks.

Why cannot conservatives get behind an increasingly popular cause? If conservatives fail to recognize this swelling demand and to identify with it, they will justify the charge that Mill leveled against them long ago.

That is a charge against conservatives and a position on a resolution that comes from a surprising source. I have just seen this.

I would be interested in your observations on that, considering that you have stated that it would destroy the very thing that we want—mutual arms reduction and deep reductions, and the opportunity to move forward, to not have to go ahead with our modernization program and to have weapons destroyed and removed from Europe. The two seem to be in sharp contrast.

Can you comment at all on James Kilpatrick's observations?

Ambassador NITZE. I have not seen those observations and therefore would be hesitant to comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if I could submit them to you to take along, under any classification that you like. I would appreciate a response from you on them, because your judgment is highly valued by members of this committee.

This is one of the tougher problems that we will have to deal with. It is being constantly referred to now as a phenomenon not unlike the Vietnam phenomenon that appeared. This is a groundswell of public support for a concept and an idea.

Just as I mentioned to a few Senators this morning at a prayer breakfast, we talk about war being too important to leave to the generals. Well, here is a case where nuclear war is too important even to leave to governments. Town hall meetings created this phenomenon and these resolutions were a reflection of a pressure that came from people, from the grassroots.

I saw it with my own eyes and I felt it in Winnetka, Ill. As I say, it was the biggest meeting I have attended in 45 years in the North Shore of Chicago. It was an intense meeting of deeply held feelings.

Ambassador NITZE. I do have one comment. I have seen public enthusiasm for various types of propositions which was really not adequately thoughtful about the consequences that would result from the thing about which they were enthusiastic. I saw that in Germany in 1929. I remember going to a May Day demonstration in the Alexanderplatz. There was an enormous enthusiasm, I believe, for a very improvident point of view. I have seen that elsewhere.

And therefore I do suggest that it is wise, when one runs into these enthusiasms, to look carefully to see whether the enthusiasm is soundly based or whether the consequences there are apt to be different than what the participants really hope from them.

The CHAIRMAN. You have responded to Soviet arguments by pointing out that their proposals would literally mean an imbalance that would be absolutely unacceptable to our allies and to ourselves. I wonder if you would share with us the responses they have made, where I presume they would be counting not just missiles in place but also cruise missiles and bombers, and what they point out in their

argumentation as to the parity which they maintain there would be. I presume that is their argument and why they make these proposals we look upon as rather far-fetched and outrageous in a sense.

Ambassador NITZE. I think they have made it clear as to what they think should be counted in the negotiations. They made it clear the systems for which the United States should take an obligation on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other side, and that our obligation should involve a ceiling which includes not only our own forces but also British and French forces as well.

They feel that the balance should include aircraft as being equivalent on a 1-to-1 basis with missiles. Their count includes the aircraft on six of our aircraft carriers, even though rarely more than two are in European waters.

Their count would not include SS-20's in Siberia or across the Urals and outside the European portion of the U.S.S.R., on the grounds that they are not intended for use in Europe. It would include the FB-111's in the United States, on the grounds that they are not included within the limits under SALT II and can be used against targets in the U.S.S.R., et cetera.

I believe they would include our F-4's, even though in our opinion they do not have a combat radius of 1,000 kilometers. We are certain of that, and the Soviet criterion is only to limit systems with a range, with a combat radius of greater than 1,000 kilometers.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just a couple of more questions. First, with respect to the Brezhnev announcement of March 16, in which he ordered a unilateral freeze on SS-20 deployments west of the Urals, which seemed to me to be like our saying that we would unilaterally agree to have no ICBM's east of the Mississippi. Has this announcement of his in any way weakened allied cohesion behind the zero option?

Ambassador NITZE. I do not believe so.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it get through to public perception, though, and mislead the public that something real was being offered?

Ambassador NITZE. That I cannot answer with the same confidence, because a lot of things go on in public opinion that I sometimes cannot feel right off the bat. But I know with respect to governments that it did not make any impression, and I do not believe it made any impression on the publics in Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Many people do believe, some of them very strongly, that any limitations agreed to in the INF talks will have little meaning unless collateral restrictions are imposed on strategic systems. Do you believe that the talks you are leading in Geneva can maintain their integrity and relevance absent a prompt commencement of the START talks themselves?

Ambassador NITZE. Clearly, there is an interrelationship between the two and it would be much better to have an agreement on the SALT-START range of weapons concurrently with an agreement on the INF weapons.

On the other hand, it was my view that SALT I was a useful agreement even though it handled only ABM's [antiballistic missiles] definitively along with a temporary and not very effective freeze on offensive weapons. Similarly, I think I could contemplate an INF

agreement which would be useful on its own basis, even though it would be better to have both.

The CHAIRMAN. I happen to believe, despite coups in Bangladesh and Guatemala and problems in Israel and all of the temporal things which happen every day which dominate the headlines, that two of the most important events that will be carried on in our lifetime in the world are your talks on INF and START when they get underway.

I just want to assure you, Ambassador Nitze, of the full support and backing of this committee in any way that we can be helpful to you. We are grateful to you for devoting your life at this stage, after a very distinguished career, to this end. I am sure you could do an awful lot of things that would be more pleasurable to you than sitting day after day with these frustrating negotiations.

We are grateful for your undertaking this on behalf of the President, and I know that you will have the full support of this committee and overwhelming support on the floor of the Senate in your confirmation. Thank you very much.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

